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Abstract
This paper evaluates inflation targeting and assesses its merits by compar-
ing alternative targets in a macroeconomic model. We use European aggregate
data to evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules under alternative in-
flation targets in terms of output losses. We employ two major alternative policy
rules, forward-looking and spontaneous adjustment, and three alternative inflation
targets, zero percent, two percent, and four percent inflation rates. The simula-
tion findings suggest that forward-looking rules contributed to macroeconomic
stability and increase monetary policy credibility. The superiority of a positive
inflation target, in terms of output losses, emerges for the aggregate data. The
same methodology, when applied to individual countries, however, suggests that
country-specific flexible inflation targeting can improve employment prospects in
Europe.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E31, E32, E37, E52
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Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Evidence from 
Aggregate European Data 
 
1. Introduction 
Inflation targeting (a regime that identifies price stability as the primary objective with 
(Svensson, 1999a) or without (King, 1997) considering output gaps), has received 
considerable attention in recent years.1 A large volume of academic papers has appeared 
and many countries introduced such a design or monetary policy2. In other words, the 
monetary authorities commit themselves under inflation targeting to keep inflation close 
to an explicit target (Ruge-Murcia, 2003). New Zealand first adopted an inflation 
targeting policy regime. Canada, the U.K., and Australia followed. Schaechter et al. 
(2000) and Corbo et al. (2001) identify over 15 countries that possess experience with 
inflation targeting. Bernanke et al. (1999) and Corbo et al. (2001) review the experience 
gained with inflation targeting. The wide acceptance of the inflation targeting 
methodology reflects the need to avoid credibility problems from a discretionary policy 
(Walsh, 1995; Svensson, 1997a), and the role inflation targeting plays in setting 
monetary policy instruments (Bernanke and Woodford, 1997; Svensson, 1997b, 2000; 
Ball, 1997).  
Svensson (1999a) defines two types of inflation targeting – strict and flexible 
inflation targeting. Strict inflation targeting implies that the monetary authorities only 
attempt to reduce the variability of the inflation rate around its target level. No other 
variable beyond the inflation variability around its target enters the monetary 
authorities’ objective function. Flexible inflation targeting allows other variables to 
enter the policy makers’ objective function, usually the variability of the output gap 
around its target of zero. In other words, flexible inflation targeting places non-zero 
weights on variables in addition to the variability of inflation around its target. We 
adopt flexible inflation targeting. 
To achieve success in their targeting program, the monetary authorities must 
employ some policy reaction function. Such reaction functions come in many different 
forms, such as the Taylor (1993) rule for the interest rate. Central banks employ an 
interest rate instrument to implement their policies, which votes in favor of the Taylor 
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rule. The original Taylor rule caused the nominal interest rate to respond to deviations 
of the inflation rate from its target level and to deviations of the output gap from zero. 
Taylor (1993) initially chooses parameter values for his rule so that the predicted 
movements in the interest rate mimicked actual movements. That is, he backed out the 
implied parameter values that must hold if the monetary authorities actually employed 
his interest rate rule, given the actual movements in the interest rate, the inflation rate, 
and the output gap. Since that original work, other researchers have estimated the 
implicit Taylor rule for different sample periods, for different precise formulations of 
the rule, and for different countries. 
Serious criticisms of inflation targeting exist. Since monetary policy affects 
inflation only with a lag, the monitoring of inflation performance is a difficult task 
(Svensson, 1997b). Others argue that inflation targeting is suboptimal since it is better 
to tolerate some, albeit low, inflation than to bear the social cost associated with price 
stability. In other words, what is the -optimal inflation rate-?. This question relates to 
Howitt’s Rule (Howitt, 1990) whereby the benefits from reduced inflation must offset 
the costs of achieving such lower inflation. Howitt concludes that the optimal target 
inflation rate exceeds zero, since moderate rates of inflation enhance economic welfare. 
That is, small positive inflation permits downward real wage movements with sticky 
nominal wages, a common feature of most European economies (Aiyagari, 1990; 
Thornton, 1996). Nevertheless, a credible monetary policy minimizes (or even 
eliminates) any costs associated with price stability or inflation targeting (Blinder, 
1989). In addition, Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000) and Arestis et al. (2002) argue that 
inflation targeting and inflation variability associated inversely and output variability 
falls far less in inflation-targeting countries. 
Central banks substantially improved their credibility when under inflation 
targeting. This last point implies that central banks must improve their accountability, 
transparency and communication (Svensson, 1999b). Most relevant studies consider the 
performance of inflation, the credibility of monetary policy, and the magnitude of the 
sacrifice ratio (i.e. the cost of lowering inflation) under inflation targeting. The majority 
of studies demonstrate that inflation targeting does not improve inflation performance 
much, lower the cost of inflation, or raise the credibility of monetary authorities 
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(Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 2000). By contrast, Ammer and Freeman (1995), Freeman and 
Willis (1995), and Mishkin and Posen (1997) present evidence that inflation 
performance improves significantly under inflation targeting. The evidence on the effect 
on the sacrifice ratio is rather mixed, however. Inflation targeting performed well in 
New Zealand and the U.K., but not so well in Canada. In terms of credibility, inflation 
targeting obliges the central bank to safeguard its credibility in pursuing the inflation 
goal. Therefore, in inflation-targeting countries central banks possess much operational 
independence. Regarding credibility, the aforementioned studies show that inflation 
targeting does not cause long lasting effects on long-term interest rates. Kahn and 
Parrish (1998), however, provide contrary results for New Zealand and Canada, two 
inflation-targeting countries. Finally, Siklos (1999) finds mixed evidence -inflation 
targeting improves inflation performance in Australia, Canada, and Sweden, but does 
not do improve performance in Finland, New Zealand, Spain, and the U.K.  
Despite the popularity of inflation targeting among policy makers, most early 
studies find little evidence that economic performance in non-inflation-targeting 
countries suffer because they did not adopt inflation targeting. More recent studies, 
however, unearth significant differences in the performance of the two group countries. 
Levin et al. (2004) find that inflation targeting affects the public’s expectations about 
inflation. In an inflation-targeting regime, the target inflation rate anchors expectations 
about inflation (mostly at longer horizons). Therefore, inflation expectations respond 
less to changes in actual inflation. That outcome pays substantial benefits to the 
economy, since expected inflation gets negotiated into various sorts of pricing contracts, 
such as labor contracts. Thus, the public’s expected inflation can produce a self-
fulfilling outcome. As such anchoring inflation expectations anchored to target inflation 
keeps inflation itself low and stable. Moreover, despite some mixed empirical support 
for inflation targeting, many academics argue in favor of inflation targeting (Bernanke 
et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2001). Recently, Neumann and von Hagen (2002) confirm 
that although inflation targeting does not clearly outperform monetary aggregate 
strategies, it still matters. By contrast, specific drawbacks to the adoption of inflation 
targeting exist. For example, an inflation-targeting regime removes the flexibility 
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needed by policy makers to respond to changing macroeconomic conditions and 
unusual unexpected events. 
 The majority of studies on monetary rules have analyzed the impact of inflation 
targeting on the U.S. economy. Excluding the paper by Peersman and Smets (1999), this 
paper evaluates inflation targeting performance using alternative optimal interest rate 
rules in a simple macroeconomic model for the European Union (EU). Within the EU 
the European Central Bank (ECB) strategy followed is to focus on the price stability 
objective through a year-on-year increase of the price level below 2 percent (Issing et 
al., 2001). This strategy has been closely followed by the ECB over the five years of its 
existence, gaining a high level of credibility (Issing, 2004).  
The primary question that this study seeks to answer is whether a zero or a 
positive inflation target is desirable. In particular, it is recognized that over the sample 
period there was not in place any convergence of policies to achieve the EMU. 
Moreover, one may argue that finding a positive inflation target ‘better’ may merely 
reflect the fact that the average inflation rate over this period was closer to 4% than it 
was to 2% or 0%.3 What merely this study does is to inquire how EU’s economic 
performance would have changed if various inflation targets had been adopted. Thus, 
the approach is to think through three hypothetical scenarios of inflation targeting by 
the EU countries and use the thought exercise to gain a better understanding of the 
output gains. Although inflation targeting offers greater credibility to the European 
monetary authorities let us not forget that the euro area countries have already a high 
degree of credibility. Therefore, the results will be very fruitful if they support that 
those countries incur a cost of a loss of output against the benefit of higher credibility in 
their fight to inflation. The additional merit of this study is that for the first time it 
employs European aggregate data in order to evaluate the aforementioned alternative 
inflation targets. Although the analysis is novel in the above respects, in most other 
ways it is entirely conventional. It makes use of standard and popular monetary policy 
rules, i.e. forward looking rules, while it uses standard econometric techniques, i.e. 
instrumental variables as well as simulation results.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
specification of an open macro model, while Section 3 presents and discusses the 
empirical analysis. Finally, concluding comments are presented in Section 4. 
2. The Model 
2.1 The benchmark model 
We adopt a version of the IS-LM-AS model proposed by Clarida et al. (1999), 
McCallum and Nelson (1999), Woodford (2000), and Clifton et al. (2001). The first 
equation describes the IS curve through which the behavior of output is dominated by 
movements of the real interest rate: 
yt = a yt-1 + b rt + εt,  0≤a<1, b<0            (1) 
where y equals the output gap, r equals the real interest rate (the difference between the 
nominal interest rate and expected inflation, ε equals a demand disturbance term that 
obeys εt = µεt-1 + λ1t, with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 and λ1t is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean 
and variance σλ12. Theoretically, the negative b reflects intertemporal substitution of 
consumption. According to equation (1), interest rates influence aggregate demand 
through consumption as well as investment. Finally, lagged output, indicating 
persistence effects, affects current output (Fuhrer, 1996). 
The second equation describes the LM curve (Haldane and Salmon, 1995): 
mt-pt = c0 + c1 yt + c2 it + vt, c1>0, c2 <0      (2) 
where v equals a monetary disturbance term.  
 The third equation captures an augmented Phillips curve as follows: 
πt = k0 + k1 πt+1e + k2 πt-1 + k3 yt-1 + θt      (3) 
where π denotes inflation, πe denotes expected inflation, and θ denotes a real 
disturbance term (cost-push shock, Svensson, 2000) that obeys θt = νθt-1 + λ2t, with 0 ≤ 
ν ≤ 1 and  λ2t is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and variance σλ22. Equation 
(3) describes a traditional expectations augmented Phillips curve (Blanchard, 1997). 
Inflation is affected by expected inflation at t+1. Moreover, persistence effects exist, 
since lagged inflation enters explicitly in equation (3) (Fuhrer, 1996; Clarida et al., 
1999). 
 The fourth equation describes the formation of expectations: 
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πte = g0 + g1 πt-1e + g2 πt-1 + ηt         (4) 
where η is a random term. Equation (4) yields after recursive substitution: 
       ∞   ∞ 
πte = g0/(1-g1) + g2 Σg1i πt-i + Σg1i ηt-i        (4a) 
      i=1             i=0 
 
According to (4a), expected inflation reflects past values of inflation (backward-looking 
expectations). Of course, the sum of gi coefficients must fall below one in absolute 
value for stability. Equations (3) and (4a), in turn, imply that inflation depends entirely 
on past values of inflation and the output gap.4  
Policy rules 
To evaluate the case of inflation targeting, we introduce explicit policy rules. The 
monetary authorities affect the inflation rate through a policy instrument, a short-term 
nominal interest rate. This last hypothesis comes against the usual assumption that the 
monetary authorities choose directly the inflation rate after observing the random 
shocks (Ruge-Murcia, 2003). Svensson (1999b, 2003) argues that a rule is nothing more 
than a commitment by a central bank to adjust its policy instrument as necessary to 
ensure that at a particular point of time the economy’s future evolution satisfies a 
certain targeting criterion, e.g. inflation. Moreover, Taylor (2000) argues that a rule is 
not a mathematical economic expression used in a mechanical fashion, but it is used as a 
benchmark guideline through which sometimes a certain degree of discretion seems to 
be crucial. 
Within a regime of inflation targeting a critical question focuses on whether a 
point target or a range around a point target is the most desirable. Usually, the difficulty 
in forecasting future inflation as well as the paucity of successful predictions about the 
effects of monetary policy on inflation has suggested the adoption of a range around the 
target (Longworth and Freedman, 2000). The wider the range is, the higher the 
likelihood that the monetary authorities keep inflation within the range and the lower 
the likelihood of altering inflationary expectations and economic behavior is in the long 
run. For empirical purposes, we use three different inflation targets, i.e. 0, 2, and 4 
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percent. In addition, we also assume that the monetary authorities raise the interest rate 
whenever the actual inflation in the previous period exceeds target inflation. 
 We use the model described by equations (1) through (3) to compare the 
performance of the above policy rules. We adopt a standard loss function, where the 
central bank dislikes high inflation rate, large output gaps, and large interest rate 
fluctuations. Therefore, following Woodford (2003) and McCallum and Nelson (2004), 
the central bank’s loss function (described by a symmetric quadratic parameterization 
functional form) at time t equals: 
Minimize Et Σj=0 βj ½ [(πt+j-π*)2 + ω1 yt+j2 + ω2 (it+j-it+j-1)2] 
where, it is the central bank’s policy rate, E is the expectation operator, ω1 and ω2 are 
positive parameters (less, but not equal, than one), and β is the discount factor. The 
parameters ω1 and ω2 show the policymakers’ aversion to output deviations from its 
potential level and to interest-rate level fluctuations. 
The policymaker minimizes the loss function subject to model described by 
equations (1) through (3) (as in Clarida et al., 1999; Peersman and Smets, 1999; 
Svensson, 1999c). By solving the policymakers’ optimization problem and through the 
first order conditions we get a non-linear rule, which responds to the developments in 
the economy. The first order conditions are: 
-βj Et(πt+j-π*) – ω1βjEtyt+j – βj-1c1 – βj-1(c1+bk3)/k1 + βjω2it+j + k1βj-1ω2it+j-1 + βj-1b=0  (4b) 
then we can solve for the reaction function instrument and get: 
it+j = [c1/βω2+b/βω2+(c1+b k3)/βk1ω2)] + (1/ω2) Et(πt+j-π*) + ω1/ω2 Etyt+j + k1/β it+j-1   (4c) 
Τhis study also used two major alternative policy rules,4 a forward looking rule 
(FLR) (Henderson and Mckibbon, 1993; Clarida et al. 1999) and the spontaneous 
adjustment rule (SAR) (Clarida et al. 1999)5. According to this set-up, the SAR rule 
indicates that inflation targeting takes into consideration output changes and changes in 
expected inflation. Both rules include a lagged interest rate term, whose interpretation is 
in terms of interest rate smoothing. According to Levin et al. (1999), rules that 
incorporate interest rate smoothing and respond to output gap changes as well as to 
deviations of inflation from its target perform relatively well. Moreover, Blinder (1999) 
argues that interest rate smoothing has received widespread practice in central banking, 
8 
 9
since central banks are potentially reluctant to change short-term interest rates by much 
as this leads to substantial variations in the prices of outstanding debts. Goodfriend and 
King (1997) and Jensen (2002) argue that forward-looking behavior really matters in 
private agent’s decisions. Moreover, the superiority of the forward-looking type of rules 
lies on the fact that it captures forward-looking behavior on the part of the central bank 
(Clarida et al. 2000). The two alternative policy rules considered are as follows: 
it = a5 + a6 (Etπt+1 – π*) + a7 Etyt+1+ a8 it-1  forward looking     (5) 
it = a9 + a10 (Etπt+1 – π*) + a11 yt + a12 it-1     spontaneous adjustment  (6) 
According to those rules, it is set each period so as to equate the expected value of π to a 
chosen target value π* (McCallum and Nelson, 1999). The rules (5) and (6) provide 
benchmarks for evaluating actual inflation and output performance with “optimal” 
performance in the euro area.   
III. Empirical Analysis 
Data 
Quarterly observations on real output (Y) measured by GDP at 1995 prices, core prices 
(CP) measured by core harmonized CPI and defined as the overall index excluding 
energy and food, the interbanking nominal interest rate (i), the money supply (M) 
measured as M1, and unemployment (u) measured as the unemployment percentage rate 
were obtained from various issues of the OECD Main Economic Indicators CD-Rom 
over the period 1974-2001. The sample includes the following European countries: 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Finland, and Greece. Some 
countries in the sample performed under inflation targeting even before the euro era, i.e. 
Finland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. For empirical purposes, the output 
gap was estimated as a residual variable through the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with 
smoothing parameter=1,600 (Hodrick and Prescott, 1981). 
The relevant variables at the European level are constructed using a weighting 
and aggregation system proposed by Maulon and Sarda (1999). According to this 
method, we convert all national variables into a chosen currency (i.e. the euro). The 
method requires the selection of the appropriate exchange rate. We employ the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate in our calculations.  
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Inflation is measured as the differences in logarithmic prices and the real interest 
rate, (r), equals the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation (i.e., the Fisher 
interest rate equation). Equation (4a) suggests using the Box and Jenkins technique for 
the estimation of expected inflation. That analysis suggests that European inflation 
follows an ARMA(2, 0) model over the period under investigation (within-the-sample- 
forecasting). That model generates our expected inflation rate series. In addition, Box 
and Jenkins analysis recommends an ARMA(1, 0) model that generates within-the-
sample forecasting values for expected output (to be used in the estimation of the first-
order condition out of the optimization problem). 
Although most countries target the CPI (Roger and Stone, 2004), core inflation 
targets play key roles in policy formulation. Core inflation measures remove volatile 
components from the overall price index, such as food and energy items. Bryan and 
Cecchetti (1994) and Roger (1997) recommend such price data so that policy makers 
can set credible inflation target bands in the process of a successful monetary policy.6 
Folkertsma and Hubrich (2001) demonstrate that overall price indices reflect every 
shock impinging on the economy, which turns the implementation of an efficient 
inflation monetary policy into a nightmare for the central banks. Cogley and Sargent 
(2000) and Cecchetti and Wynne (2003) also support the idea of a core index for 
monetary policy strategy within the ECB (i.e., adjusting short-term interest rates so that 
inflation converges to its target in the long run). Moreover, Vega and Wynne (2003) 
argue that a core index provides comparability across all EU members, while Breuss 
(2002) also argues that monetary policy should orient towards core inflation in the 
Euroland, since the exclusion of such volatile items as energy and food lowers the 
volatility of inflation itself, resulting in lower interest rates and, therefore, higher 
income outcomes. Finally, Bagliano et al. (2002) argue that core inflation data proves 
more important, since such data are constructed through a forward-looking method. 
Throughout the paper lower case letters denote variables expressed in logarithms, while 
all estimates and tests were derived using the econometric software of RATS, version 
4.2, and that of MicroFit, version 5.1.  
10 
 11
Comparative output and inflation results: euro area data 
Table 1 reports estimates of the model parameters through the first order 
condition (4b) using the generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology 
proposed by Hansen and Singleton (1982). The estimation of the model (1) through (3) 
gives the estimates of certain parameters, which are very close to their counterparts 
estimated through GMM. From GMM estimates we will use the parameters involved in 
the interest rate rule. Three lags of the short-term interest rate (in a stationary form), 
inflation, and output gap are included as instruments. According to Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993), in small samples efficiency gains from using more instruments are 
obtained at the cost of a greater bias in the estimates. Thus, the number of instruments 
was chosen to ensure parameter identification while minimizing the bias. Moreover, as 
a quantitative definition of inflation targeting, we impose the three alternative inflation 
targets, i.e. 0 per cent, 2 per cent, and 4 per cent under the three alternative rules, i.e., 
backward, forward, and spontaneous. The J-statistic, which is asymptotically distributed 
as a x2M-K distribution with M being the number of instruments and K the number of 
parameters to be estimated, displays that the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying 
restrictions is never rejected. In other words, the model seems to perform relatively 
well. 
Table 2 reports the estimated model. In particular, it reports the estimation of 
equations (1) through (3) with the SURE methodology over the sample period. All 
variables (except the output gap and inflation) have been measured as log-deviations 
(except interest rates) from their steady-state values (unit root tests are available upon 
request). The coefficients in equation (1) to (3) behave as expected from theory. 
Sargan’s instrument validity tests indicate that the chosen instruments are independent 
of the error term. The estimated model was used to generate artificial values for the 
output gap and inflation in terms of mean and variances.  
The results, reported in Table 2 suggest that both rules are a satisfactory 
description of policy. In particular, the coefficients on output gap as well as on inflation 
are statistically significant and show the correct sign. The smoothing interest rate 
coefficient is ranging from 0.541 to 0.558, suggesting a high degree of interest rate 
smoothing. It is also worth mentioning that the rules indicate that the current inflation or 
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expected inflation coefficients are statistically significant and above unity, implying that 
in the face of inflation, central banks raise interest rates enough to keep the real rate 
constant and, thus, to curb inflationary pressures.  
Following the estimation of the model (1) through (3), we incorporate the rules 
built with the assistance of the GMM estimations and then we generate artificial values 
for the output gap and inflation (equations (1) and (3), respectively). Table 3 reports the 
relative performance under the two alternative policy rules, along with the actual 
performance. We employ a zero-, a two-, and a four-percent target inflation rates. The 
counterfactual experiments address the following question: How would the output gap 
and the inflation rate have evolved over the sample period, if the monetary policy 
makers had followed each of the two optimal policy rules throughout that period?  
Several interesting results emerge. First, a negative trade-off exists between the 
mean output gap and the mean inflation rate as well as between the output-gap and 
inflation-rate variances. That first trade-off suggests a short-run Phillips curve. The 
second negative trade-off between the variances of the output gap and the inflation rate 
appears frequent in the literature (Fuhrer, 1997). Ball (1997) and Bean (1998) argue that 
the monetary authorities find it extremely difficult to satisfy simultaneously both their 
output-gap and inflation-rate targets, since the economy continuously experiences 
various supply and demand shocks. Therefore, the authorities must decide how fast to 
correct any divergence of the inflation rate from its target (i.e., achieve as low a 
variance of inflation around its target at the expense of a higher output gap variance or 
maintain a low output variance and accept a higher inflation-rate variance around its 
target). In other words, the monetary authorities reach optimal decisions through a 
trade-off between the volatilities of the two variables under investigation. Such a policy 
menu represents an optimal policy frontier, given the relative weighting of these two 
variables in the loss function. 
Second, the optimal policy rules suggest that the forward-looking rule dominates 
in most respects the other rule. The forward-looking rule exhibits higher mean output, 
lower mean inflation, lower output-gap variance, and lower inflation variance than the 
alternative rule. The importance of forward-looking expectations becomes substantial in 
successful policy implementation, which favorably affects the credibility of the 
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monetary authorities (i.e., the ECB). Moreover, Batini and Haldane (1998) and Amano 
et al. (1999) also show that forward-looking rules prove more efficient, in terms of 
lower mean and variable inflation. The results in Table 3 support those arguments.  
Robustness analysis: Country data instead of euro area data 
This section examines the robustness of the results after disaggregating to the country 
level. In particular, we apply the same method to Germany, France, Spain and Greece. 
In each case, we reestimate the macroeconometric model, equations (1) through (3) (the 
results are available upon request).  
Table 4 reports the output gap and inflation results. They show that the findings 
at the aggregate level generally remain valid for three out of the four countries under 
investigation (i.e., Germany, France and Spain). Greece, however, exhibits different 
results. In particular, the mean output gap and the mean inflation rate correlate 
positively, unlike the negative correlation for the aggregate results.  
 If we accept the conclusions of Akerlof et al. (2000) (i.e., unemployment 
remains below the natural rate only if inflation rates are kept (moderately) above zero), 
then our 4% inflation targeting for Germany, France and Spain could lubricate their 
economies through the flexibility of real wages, resulting in a lower, more stable, output 
gap (see also, Wyplosz, 2001). In contrast, a higher inflation-targeting regime seems 
inappropriate for the Greek economy as it also increases output-gap. To some extent, 
our empirical findings converge on Svensson’s (1999b) conclusions that higher 
‘flexible’ inflation targeting for certain European economies will gradually stabilize 
output and unemployment, while inflation variability should fall below the case of 
‘strict’ inflation targeting (current policy). In Greece public investments can sustain 
growth. Public spending and growing deficits shift the aggregate demand and produce 
higher inflation and inflation expectations, which is a destabilizing process. In such a 
perverse situation, Greece must closely watch labor productivity and unit labor costs. 
Nevertheless, since Greece is a relatively closed economy in the euro area, only a 
‘strict’ low inflation targeting with frequent intervention of monetary authorities can 
stabilize the output gap against aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks. 
13 
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Robustness analysis: Alternative measures of the output gap  
The literature on optimal monetary policy pays special attention to the methodology 
used to measure the output gap (Ball, 1997; Clarida et al. 1999; Orphanides, 1999; 
Rudebusch, 1999; Svenson and Woodford 2000; Camba-Mendez and Rodriguez-
Palenzuela, 2003). To test the robustness of our results we use an alternative method of 
estimating the output gap. In particular, we adopt a multivariate time-series model. 
Following the method of Apel and Jansson (1999) and Camba-Mendez and Rodriguez-
Palenzuela (2003), a three-variable system –real output, inflation, and unemployment- 
generates measures of the output gap. We employ a structural vector autoregressive 
(SVAR) model with certain long-run restrictions. In particular, inflation only responds 
to its own structural shocks, real output only responds to its own and inflation shocks, 
while unemployment responds to three shocks simultaneously. After estimating the 
three-variable system (results available on request) and getting the new detrended 
output gap data, we repeat our analysis and Table 5 reports the results. They nearly 
match those reached in Table 3.   
  In addition to VAR-constructed gap measures, it is useful to use ‘off-the-shelf’ 
measures, e.g. OECD output gaps. After obtaining those measures for the Europe-12 
group from the OECD Main Economic Indicators CD-ROM and over the period 1980-
2002, the results are reported in Table 6. They do not point any differences to those 
reached before (Table 5). An inflation target away from zero seems to be the 
appropriate policy followed, since it exhibits superiority, in terms of lower output gaps.  
Robustness analysis: An alternative sample period-The 1990s  
Inflation in Europe was much higher in the past, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. As 
such, reasonable inflation targets for today may produce unreasonable targets for the 
past. Also, the variation of inflation across European countries fell dramatically in 
recent years. Some even argue that cyclical fluctuations in the 1990s were smaller than 
those in the 1980s (Bernanke et al., 1999; Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 2000; Arestis et al., 
2002). Thus, it is difficult to determine whether lower fluctuations reflect inflation 
targeting or more favorable shocks. We address this concern by reestimating and 
simulating the model only during the 1990s. In particular, we estimated equations (1) 
through (3) from 1990:1 through 2001:4 and then we generated in-sample forecasting 
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values. Table 7 reports the results. They are consistent with an inflation target away 
from zero that seems to be a successful regime choice, in terms of lower output gaps. In 
addition, the average output gap and the average inflation rate for the simulated 
performance are lower in the 1990s than in the full sample findings, implying that the 
implementation of monetary policy under inflation targeting still receives favorable 
support even within an environment with less frequent economic shocks. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Our paper contributes to the assessment of inflation targeting by assessing the merits of 
alternative policy rules and alternative inflation targets in a macroeconometric model. 
Our study uses for the first time European aggregate data to evaluate the performance of 
these alternative policy rules and alternative inflation targets where the European 
monetary authorities employ a loss function on deviations of output, inflation, and 
interest rates from their target values.  
Two specific policy rules were tested, a forward-looking rule and a spontaneous-
adjustment rule. The empirical findings indicated that forward-looking rules contributed 
significantly to macroeconomic stability, resulting in lower business cycle fluctuations 
and increased monetary policy credibility. Three alternative inflation targets were 
tested, i.e. a zero percent, a two percent, and a four percent inflation rate. Except in the 
case of Greece, we find a negative correlation between the average output gap and the 
average inflation rate across the three different inflation targets both for aggregate and 
disaggregated data. Higher inflation targets lead to lower average output gaps and 
higher average inflation. At the same time, the counterfactual experiments indicate a 
negative correlation between the output-gap variance and the inflation-rate variance 
across the three different inflation targets. Higher inflation targets lead to higher 
inflation-rate variances and lower output-gap variances. For Greece, we find a positive 
correlation between the average output gap and the average inflation rate. But the 
negative correlation between the output-gap variance and the inflation-rate variance 
continues to hold. 
 As an agenda of future research, the authors plan to extend the policy rule 
analysis by incorporating exchange rate as well as financial variables, since inflation 
targeting acts as a pre-requisite for strengthening financial markets and through them 
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the real economy. The central banks that implement an inflation targeting strategy think 
primarily of reducing the distortions on financial markets caused by monetary policy. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Since monetary and fiscal policy affect aggregate demand, policies designed to 
stabilize inflation (price level) will automatically stabilize real GDP when the economy 
only faces aggregate demand shocks. If, however, the economy primarily experiences 
aggregate supply shocks, then stabilizing inflation (price level) will increase the 
variability of real output. 
2. Price stability was Friedman’s suggestion. The control of the price level was 
Keynes’s concern through certain guidelines, albeit the control was not proved to be 
very successful. However, as variation in aggregate demand cases the GDP volatility, 
price stability cannot be maintained without losses in output and employment since 
markets are ripped off their dynamism. Producers cannot respond to increased demand 
unless they are caught by surprise that reinforces their tentative motivation. 
3. Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000) emphasize that some inflation lubricates the economy and 
allows for more flexible adjustments in real wages. Wyplosz (2001) also argues that the 
European Central Bank by announcing low inflation targets (e.g. 2 percent) increases 
rigidities in the economy and thus leads to higher structural unemployment. In contrast, 
Issing (2001) argues that low inflation contributes to the elimination of money illusion, 
which, in turn, lessens the need for positive inflation rates to ‘lubricate’ the system. 
Furthermore, low inflation targets also expose the economy to the risk that inflation 
may drop below 0 percent, a dangerous situation that can push the economy into a 
deflationary spiral.  
4. According to Peersman and Smets (1999), the external transmission channel (the 
exchange rate between the dollar and the DM) does not appear to be significant. 
Although this could raise some serious criticisms, we consider that the euro area 
functions as a relatively closed economy. 
5. We use simple rules that ignore a large amount of information about the economy, 
such as variables representing, labor and financial markets, for example. The benefit of 
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a simple rule comes from the parsimony in the specification but the cost emerges 
because of the inability to take advantage of this information. Levin et al. (1999), 
Dennis (2002), and Levin and Williams (2003) find that only small improvements in 
performance exist from moving to more-complicated rules. By contrast, Finan and 
Tetlow (1999) reach the opposite result.  
6. Others recommend alternative and more sophisticated measures of inflation for an 
inflation targeting monetary policy regime, such as trimmed mean indices (Bryan and 
Cecchetti, 1994; Bryan et al., 1999). The lack of such data for all members of the 
Euroland requires our analysis to be based on original core price index data. 
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Table 1. GMM estimates 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Coefficients:             c1    b      k1          k3  ω2    ω1     β    J 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Rules-Targets 
 
Forward-0%            0.56          -0.106         0.49        0.128 0.47   0.13   0.97    [0.55] 
       (3.98)*      (-4.11)*     (4.25)*       (4.52)*      (4.31)*    (4.71)*  (3.98)* 
Forward-2%       0.57          -0.109         0.54        0.134 0.48   0.14   0.98    [0.57] 
       (4.15)*      (-3.97)*     (4.18)*       (4.20)*      (4.19)*    (5.07)*  (4.39)* 
Forward-4%       0.60          -0.107         0.57        0.137 0.55   0.15   0.97    [0.59] 
       (4.71)*      (-4.28)*      (4.39)*      (3.97)*      (4.63)*    (4.19)*  (4.84)* 
Spontaneous-0%     0.53          -0.096         0.48        0.119 0.57   0.12   0.95    [0.43] 
       (3.83)*      (-3.47)**    (4.14)*      (3.55)**    (3.86)*    (4.53)*  (4.67)* 
Spontaneous-2%     0.58          -0.103         0.50        0.125 0.56   0.13   0.96    [0.48] 
       (4.02)*      (-3.87)*      (3.81)*     (4.19)*       (3.45)**  (4.71)*  (4.17)* 
Spontaneous-4%    0.57           -0.102         0.49        0.126 0.59   0.14   0.95    [0.46] 
      (3.90)*      (4.03)*       (3.39)**    (4.84)*      (4.09)*    (4.22)*  (4.55)* 
Notes: Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics, while those in brackets denote p-values. 
* significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 2. Multivariate (IV) estimations under alternative policy rules and inflation 
targets 
Model Estimations               _ 
Equation (1)                   Sargan’s test         R2
yt = 0.57 yt-1 – 0.108 rt                  0.0214[0.87]         0.54 
     (4.29)*      (-5.11)*                  
instruments: constant, yt-2, yt-3, rt-1, rt-2  
 
Equation (2)                               
(mt-pt) = 0.084 + 0.59 yt – 0.114 it                                     0.0302[0.66]        0.78 
              (3.92)* (4.55)*   (-4.64)*                            
instruments: constant, (m-p)t-1, yt-1, yt-2, it-2
 
Equation (3)                                     
πt = 0.0109 + 0.53 πt-1 + 0.41 πt-2 + 0.131 yt-1          0.0318[0.58]       0.76 
      (3.68)*    (3.95)*     (3.49)*     (4.12)*             
instruments: constant, πt-3, πt-4, yt-2, yt-3, yt-4
 
Rules (through the first order conditions) 
Forward-0%  
it = 3.45 + 2.13 πt+1e + 0.28 yt+1 e  + 0.546 it-1
         
Forward-2%  
it = 3.17 + 2.08 (πt+1e – 0.02) + 0.29 yt+1 e  + 0.541 it-1
      
Forward-4%  
it = 2.84 + 1.82 (πt+1e – 0.04) + 0.27 yt+1 e + 0.546 it-1
      
Spontaneous-0%  
it = 2.80 + 1.75 πt+1e + 0.21 yt + 0.558 it-1
        
Spontaneous-2%  
it = 3.00 + 1.79 (πt+1e – 0.02) + 0.23 yt + 0.552 it-1
 
Spontaneous-4%  
it = 2.87 + 1.69 (πt+1e – 0.04) + 0.24 yt  + 0.558 it-1
Notes: Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics, while numbers in brackets denote p-values. Sargan 
refers to the Sargan’s instrument validity test.  
* significant at the 1-percent level 
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Table 3. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets (core 
price data-HP filter for output gap) 
Rule    Output      Inflation 
                                 Mean  Variance            Mean  Variance 
Actual data          -0.6     3.66   3.2     16.23 
 
Artificial data 
FLR-0           -1.4     2.52      2.5     11.52    
FLR-2           -1.1     2.31      2.8     12.47    
FLR-4           -0.6     2.01      3.4     13.61    
 
SAR-0           -1.4     3.35   3.5     12.58 
SAR-2           -1.0     2.83   3.6     13.90 
SAR-4           -0.7     2.28   4.2     16.09 
 
Notes: The simulation covers the period 1974:1 – 2001:4. The mean variables are expressed as a percent. 
The suffixes 0, 2, and 4 after the acronyms of  FLR, and SAR indicate the percent inflation-rate target 
(i.e., 0 percent, 2 percent, and 4 percent). 
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Table 4. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets 
(Germany, France, Spain and Greece) 
Rule    Output      Inflation 
                                 Mean  Variance           Mean  Variance 
Germany 
Actual data          -1.1     6.51   3.1     3.63 
 
Artificial data 
FLR-0           -1.6     5.48      2.3     1.82     
FLR-2           -1.0     4.51      3.1     3.04     
FLR-4           -0.8     4.06      3.3     3.84     
 
SAR-0           -1.7     6.51   3.5     1.95 
SAR-2           -1.4     5.29   4.2     3.31 
SAR-4           -1.1     4.61   4.7     3.68 
 
France 
Actual data         -1.2     3.98   5.7    20.72 
 
Artificial data 
FLR-0          -1.5     3.29      3.8    16.26     
FLR-2          -1.1     2.53      4.3    19.08     
FLR-4          -0.9     2.32      4.9    24.12     
 
SAR-0          -1.6     4.17   4.4    20.59 
SAR-2          -1.4     3.55   5.3    26.32 
SAR-4          -1.1     2.48   5.8    32.09 
 
Spain 
Actual data         -1.9     6.52   9.4    38.94 
 
Artificial data 
FLR-0          -1.1     5.69      8.1    26.39     
FLR-2          -0.9     4.41      8.5    32.11     
FLR-4          -0.7     4.08      9.0    36.49     
 
SAR-0          -2.7     6.81   8.7    33.18 
SAR-2          -2.2     5.75   9.6    40.23 
SAR-4          -1.8     4.60             10.3                45.36 
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Table 4 continued 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Greece 
Actual data               -0.5     9.97            14.6     47.61 
 
Artificial data 
FLR-0          -0.7     9.22               12.4    37.19     
FLR-2          -1.5     7.42               14.4    43.85     
FLR-4          -1.8     6.39               17.2    48.12     
 
SAR-0          -1.7   13.07            13.8    41.97 
SAR-2          -2.2   12.24            15.5    48.53 
SAR-4          -2.8     8.84            20.8    52.77 
 
Notes: See Table 3. 
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Table 5. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets (core 
price data-SVAR filter for output gap) 
Rule    Output      Inflation 
                                 Mean  Variance           Mean  Variance 
Actual data          -0.6     3.66   3.2     16.23 
 
Artificial data 
FLR-0           -1.4     3.32      2.1     10.44    
FLR-2           -1.1     2.49      2.4     14.19    
FLR-4           -0.6     2.12      3.1     16.02    
 
SAR-0           -2.1     3.57   2.6     12.15 
SAR-2           -1.3     2.82   3.6     14.79 
SAR-4           -0.9     2.40   4.1     18.05 
 
Notes: See Table 3.  
 
 
Table 6. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets (core 
price data: OECD output-gap measures-1980-2002) 
Rule    Output      Inflation 
                                 Mean  Variance           Mean  Variance 
Actual data          -0.5                           2.89                            3.0                        15.12 
 
Artificial data 
FLR-0           -1.2     2.62      1.3     11.03    
FLR-2           -1.0     2.49      1.7     12.57    
FLR-4           -0.5     2.25      3.0     14.58    
 
SAR-0           -2.4     3.28   2.8     12.69 
SAR-2           -1.5     2.79   3.4     15.21 
SAR-4           -0.8     2.57   3.9     15.94 
 
Notes: OECD measures are relative to the EU-12 group. See also Table 3.  
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Table 7. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets (the 
1990s-core inflation-HP filter for output gap) 
Rule    Output      Inflation 
                                 Mean  Variance            Mean  Variance 
Actual data          -0.4                           2.19                             2.7                        13.37 
 
Artificial data 
FLR-0           -1.3     2.57      1.9     10.64    
FLR-2           -1.1     2.30      2.3     12.91    
FLR-4           -0.7     2.16      2.9     14.22    
 
SAR-0           -1.8     3.51   2.3     11.32 
SAR-2           -1.2     2.89   2.7     15.14 
SAR-4           -0.8     2.44   3.6     16.71 
 
Notes: See Table 3.  
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